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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) commonly identifies the
upcoming network society where all connectable devices will
be able to communicate with one another. In addition, IoT
devices are supposed to be directly connected to the Internet,
and many of them are likely to be battery powered. Hence,
they are particularly vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks specifically aimed at quickly draining battery and severely
reducing device lifetime. In this paper, we propose SMACK, a
security service which efficiently identifies invalid messages early
after their reception, by checking a short and lightweight Message
Authentication Code (MAC). So doing, further useless processing
on invalid messages can be avoided, thus reducing the impact
of DoS attacks and preserving battery life. In particular, we
provide an adaptation of SMACK for the standard Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP). Finally, we experimentally evaluate
SMACK performance through our prototype implementation for
the resource constrained CC2538 platform. Our results show
that SMACK is efficient and affordable in terms of memory
requirements, computing time, and energy consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is commonly used today to refer to
the growing information technology trend towards a networked
society, where all devices that can benefit from a connection
will be connected with one another [1][2]. This means that,
unlike the past paradigm where mainly computers and mobile
phones were globally interconnected over the Internet, now all
kinds of electronic equipment are about to be available online.
This trend is expected to accelerate in the next years, thanks to
the decreasing cost of hardware platforms and network devices,
as well as the maturity of the Internet technology.
However, many IoT devices feature limited resources, and
are likely to be battery powered. Also, many of them are
used in sensitive or even critical tasks, such as industrial plant
control and health monitoring application scenarios. Thus, if
devices run out of battery power and stop functioning, they
can possibly cause severe damage or injuries to people, and
result in further costs to perform system recovery, as well as
battery replacement or recharge. Hence, it is vital to preserve
device battery life as much as possible.
A common low-level approach to reduce energy consump-
tion consists in allowing devices to switch to sleep mode
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for a while, in a pre-defined periodic fashion or when no
pending tasks have to be accomplished. While in sleep mode,
network interfaces can stop their activities, or even be turned
off, so considerably reducing energy consumption. On the
other hand, traditional high-level communication protocols are
considered inefficient or too complex to be adopted on simple,
resource constrained, IoT devices. This has led to designing
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [3], a lightweight
web transfer protocol for use with constrained devices.
However, IoT constrained devices are particularly prone to
a number of security threats, especially if directly connected
to the Internet, i.e. with no protection provided by a firewall or
gateway. In particular, possible security attacks include Denial
of Service (DoS), which may have the specific intent to prevent
devices from switching to sleep mode, thus quickly draining
battery energy. Such attacks are often referred as Denial of
Sleep attacks, and represent a real and severe threat against
small battery powered devices [4][5][6]. Moreover, the occur-
rence of DoS cannot be avoided altogether. In fact, it is suffi-
cient that an adversary keeps on transmitting bogus messages
to force the recipient device to process them. Instead, a feasible
and practical countermeasure would consist in reducing the
attack impact as much as possible, with particular reference to
energy consumption due to useless message processing.
Counteracting such attacks is definitely not easy, especially
for IoT devices directly connected to the Internet and globally
accessible for operation requests, as well as remote manage-
ment and configuration. Although CoAP suggests to secure
communication by means of the Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) protocol [7], the latter relies on a complex and
costly handshake to establish a secure connection. Moreover,
DTLS handshake itself is vulnerable to DoS battery drain at-
tacks. In fact, an adversary can flood the target device with fake
ClientHello messages, thus repeatedly triggering costly oper-
ations on the device side. Most alternative solutions against
battery exhaustion rely on intrusion detection techniques, or
traditional link layer security. However, the formers normally
require to collect and analyze a large amount of network traffic,
so being unwieldy or even unfeasible to be adopted [4], while
the latters are likely to display a non negligible impact on
performance, especially in terms of energy consumption [8][9].
This paper presents SMACK, a security service based on
short Message Authentication Codes (MACs), which early and
efficiently detects invalid messages upon their reception, thus
considerably reducing the impact of Denial of Sleep attacks. In
particular, by checking short MAC correctness, it is possible978-1-4673-7331-9/15/$31.00 c© 2015 IEEE
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to quickly verify whether received messages are valid or not,
i.e. if they have been possibly sent by illegitimate sources. In
such a case, devices can avoid performing useless additional
parsing and processing, so considerably reducing the damage
that an attacker can cause in terms of energy consumption,
and thus preserving battery life. Also, we suggest a tunable
and adaptive reaction mechanism that can be adopted upon
detecting invalid messages, so specifically addressing Denial
of Sleep attacks, and forestalling battery exhaustion.
We provide an adaptation of SMACK for the CoAP proto-
col that does not require to modify the original message format.
Nevertheless, SMACK is based on a general approach, and can
be integrated in other protocols at any communication layer.
Besides, we experimentally evaluate SMACK performance
through our prototype implementation for the resource con-
strained CC2538 platform. Our results show that SMACK is
efficient and affordable in terms of memory requirements,
computing time, and energy consumption. Also, when com-
pared to DTLS, our approach detects invalid messages while
displaying a smaller computing overhead, and requiring no
additional communication with the constrained device.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss related works. Section III describes the considered
application scenario, while Section IV overviews the CoAP
protocol. Section V presents SMACK and how it can be
adapted to CoAP, while in Section VI we propose a reactive
strategy to address DoS attacks upon their occurrence. Section
VII discusses a possible way to perform the short MAC com-
putation, while in Section VIII we show how the administrative
key material can be generated. Section IX describes a possible
way to adapt the generation of CoAP Message IDs, while in
Section X we provide a performance evaluation of SMACK.
Finally, in Section XI, we draw our conclusive remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Battery exhaustion has been considered a real and severe
threat for a long time now. In 1999, Stajano and Anderson
suggested that a malicious node could perform a sleep de-
privation torture attack, i.e. behave with the only purpose to
consume the victim’s battery energy [5]. Then, a number of
relevant works have stressed the severity of Denial of Sleep
attacks, both in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and in
general mobile computer environments [4][6]. More recently,
even energy attacks on server systems have been considered
as a possible serious threat to deal with [10].
In [6], the authors identify three different forms of sleep de-
privation attack: service request; benign; and malignant power
attacks. In service request attacks, the adversary repeatedly
performs valid service requests to the victim device, to drain
its residual energy. In a benign attack, she induces her victim
to indefinitely perform a valid but energy-hungry process. In
a malignant power attack, she compromises devices and alters
their original behavior to increase energy consumption.
Several works about detection techniques against Denial
of Sleep attacks have been presented, often based on traffic
analysis or other anomaly detection mechanisms. In [11], the
authors describe B-SIPS, a system based on an innovative
Dynamic Threshold Calculation algorithm that alerts upon
detecting power changes. Specifically, it considers running
activities, and compares their energy consumption with the ex-
pected one, looking for possible anomalies. In [12], Bhattasali
and Chaki propose a probabilistic model to detect Denial of
Sleep attacks, based on Absorbing Markov Chain (AMC). In
particular, they associate the Markov Chain absorption time
with the network lifetime, and assume that a Denial of Sleep
attack is being performed in case the system state converges
to network death too fast with respect to the expected battery
discharging trend. Unfortunately, as highlighted in [4], such
solutions based on intrusion detection techniques normally
require to capture and analyze a large amount of network
traffic, which can be difficult or even unfeasible for many
resource constrained IoT devices.
Other presented approaches rely on traditional security
services, especially at the link layer. In [6], the authors propose
a power-secure architecture, relying on multi-layer authenti-
cation and energy signature monitoring. It aims at processing
only requests that deserve a high level of trust, and identifying
intrusions that would result in the execution of energy-hungry
services. However, apart from the general suggestions, no
concrete schemes to achieve battery drain robustness have been
proposed in [6]. Nonetheless, it is claimed there is a real need
for an early and lightweight message authentication check, in
order to withstand battery drain attacks. In [13], Raymond
and Midkiff present CARL, a rate limiting approach based on
current host-based intrusion detection techniques. Specifically,
CARL performs attack detection at the link layer, considering
messages to be legitimate only if both authenticated and not
replayed. Then, the rate of malicious traffic is determined by
comparing maintained information on recent messages, and
actions based on rate limiting are taken to mitigate the attack
effects, trading network lifetime with network throughput. In
[4], Raymond et al. consider different attacks against a number
of link layer protocols, and prove that Denial of Sleep attacks
can be easily performed, with no need to break link layer
encryption. In order to mitigate the impact of such attacks,
they propose a framework based on link layer authentication,
replay protection, and jamming identification.
The above mentioned detection approaches based on tradi-
tional security services are likely to result in a not negligible
overhead, especially in terms of energy consumption [8].
Also, in case security services at the link layer are adopted,
message validity must be checked by every network node
in the path between the source and destination endpoint. Of
course, this results in a further non negligible impact on
network performance as a whole. Moreover, it requires to
establish secure trust relationships among all involved nodes in
the communication path (e.g. through pairwise cryptographic
keys), thus likely failing in efficiently providing protection
against Denial of Sleep attacks from an end-to-end standpoint.
Unlike the solutions mentioned above, SMACK is a proac-
tive security service that promptly and efficiently recognizes
invalid (and likely hostile) messages upon their reception, in
order to detect Denial of Sleep attacks. It has been designed
to address mainly service-requesting attacks, but represents a
valid countermeasure also against benign attacks [6]. As de-
scribed in Section V, SMACK relies on a short and lightweight
Message Authentication Code (MAC) in order to check va-
lidity of messages early after their reception, and avoid any
additional and unnecessary parsing efforts on non valid ones.
III. APPLICATION SCENARIO AND THREAT MODEL
We consider an application scenario where an adversary
can easily perform a Denial of Sleep attack against a resource
constrained device. With particular reference to a service
request attack [6], the adversary can repeatedly send request
messages to the device relying on unicast or multicast commu-
nication, so inducing it to continuously parse and process them
upon their reception. Hereafter, we refer to such requests sent
by the adversary as invalid messages. Furthermore, the consid-
ered attack would prevent the device from possibly switching
to sleep mode, i.e. it would be unable to stop its network
interface activities in order to reduce power consumption. Also,
the device might be induced to execute operations requested
by the adversary, with additional damage in terms of service
availability and energy consumption.
As a consequence, as well as affecting network per-
formance and application availability, the considered attack
severely impacts on the device energy consumption, thus
drastically reducing its battery lifetime. Thus, we believe it
is vital to distinguish between valid and non valid request
messages as soon as possible once they have been received
by the device, as we further discuss in Section VI.
However, at the same time, we would like to avoid that only
a single entity has access right to the constrained device, which
must actually be available to all authorized clients having such
a permission. A natural way to address this is considering
a model where a client, before requesting a service to the
device, needs to obtain an authorization to perform such a
request. Similarly to the model described in [14], we assume
that such decisions are taken by a dedicated centralized entity.
By offloading the whole authorization procedure to a central
entity, a lot of computational overhead can be avoided on
the constrained device side. In particular, we assume that the
implemented policies allow the central entity to effectively de-
termine whether to issue an authorization to a requesting client.
In the considered scenario, we rely on such a central entity as
a pure key manager, i.e. a Key Distribution Center (KDC), but
it can be utilized also as a more general authorization server
as described in [14]. Note that, in practice, the KDC can be
implemented either as a real centralized entity or according to
a distributed architecture. With respect to an approach based
on proxies, this model has the advantage that the actual client
and server communication at the end user application does not
require any particular adaptations.
Fig. 1. Application scenario.
In the rest of this paper, we refer to the application scenario
depicted in Figure 1, and consider the presence of three distinct
entities, namely an IoT device D, a client C, and the KDC.
We assume that device D is associated to the KDC, and
that they are in a mutual trust relationship. Also, D and the
KDC share a symmetric cryptographic master key KM , which
is not directly used for secure communication, but only to
generate other security material, as described in Section VIII.
In the following, we assume that KM has been established
before device deployment, during the initial configuration
phase of device D, also referred as imprinting [5]. Note that,
in real IoT scenarios, the KDC would reasonably provide also
other services, such as the authorization procedure mentioned
above. Hence, key management does not practically require to
introduce a dedicated key infrastructure.
In order to communicate with one another, the involved
entities C, D, and the KDC rely on the Constrained Appli-
cation Protocol (CoAP) [3]. Communication can be possibly
secured, i.e. exchanged messages may be protected to assure
that application security requirements are met. To this aim, the
CoAP specifications recommend to adopt the DTLS protocol.
Further details about specific cryptographic means adopted to
secure communication are out of the scope of this paper.
Before starting to communicate with device D, client C
first contacts the KDC, in order to obtain: i) a cryptographic
session key used by SMACK to process messages addressed
to D; and ii) a valid Message ID to be used for the first one
of such messages. We provide more details about management
of session keys and Message IDs in Sections VIII and IX.
IV. COAP OVERVIEW
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [3] is a standard
web transfer protocol, for use with constrained devices and
networks (e.g. low-power and lossy). It is intended especially
for machine-to-machine (M2M) applications, such as smart
energy and building automation, and runs over UDP, thus not
assuming reliable message transport. Also, it is not session-
based and can handle loss or delayed delivery of messages.
Fig. 2. CoAP message format.
Figure 2 depicts the structure of a CoAP message. The
first byte contains the protocol version Ver, a type field T
with basic message type information, and the size in bytes
of the Token field, namely TKL. The Code field contains
more precise message type information, while the Message
ID field is a unique ID used to track messages and detect
possible duplications. The optional Token field can be used to
match request and response messages, and its values should
be generated at random as well as uniquely for each request.
The field ranges between 0 and 8 bytes in size, aims at making
CoAP more robust against IP-spoofing attacks, and its usage is
strongly recommended in case security is not provided at the
transport layer. Furthermore, several different CoAP options
have been defined, and it is possible to specify a list of them
according to a Type-Length-Content scheme. Finally, the CoAP
message content is included in the Payload field.
So far, no specific security related procedures have been
defined for the CoAP protocol. Instead, it is recommended to
adopt DTLS [7] if authentication, integrity, or confidentiality
are required. However, using DTLS to provide protection
against battery drain attacks might not be the best solution,
since it requires the execution of a complex handshake proce-
dure, which is itself a considerable target for DoS attacks.
V. MESSAGE VALIDITY CHECK
If we consider resource constrained, typically battery pow-
ered, devices and their need to limit energy consumption, then
it would be better if they could early and easily check if
received messages come from legitimate sources or not. Such
a procedure should be compatible with the adopted commu-
nication protocol stack, and should allow for detecting invalid
messages as early as possible upon their reception. Also, it
should be as lightweight as possible, i.e. efficient in terms of
computing overhead and resulting energy consumption.
Early detection of message validity for battery drain pre-
vention is applicable to many communication scenarios. How
to actually use such an approach strictly depends on the consid-
ered protocols and communication technologies. However, we
believe it is interesting to address battery drain prevention with
particular reference to constrained embedded devices. Hence,
we chose to design our approach so that it is primarily tailored
to CoAP. That is, in the rest of this paper, we assume that
SMACK is adopted at the application level, and relies on the
CoAP protocol. Nevertheless, SMACK is general, and can be
potentially adopted at any layer in the communication stack, by
introducing a short MAC value in the regular message header.
More in detail, SMACK relies on early checking a short
MAC, thus promptly asserting if a given message can be
considered valid or not upon its reception. So doing, in case
of invalid (possibly forged) received messages, it is possible to
avoid further parsing and verification procedures, thus saving a
consistent amount of energy, and extending battery life. Also,
if several invalid messages are received in a very short time
interval, the recipient device may assume that a DoS attack is
being performed, and can adopt reactive countermeasures in
order to limit its impact (see Section VI).
The goal of our approach is to provide a good protec-
tion against battery drain attacks, while displaying very low
complexity as well as an affordable computing and energy
overhead. To this end, we rely on short Message Authentica-
tion Codes (MACs), computed by means of security material
derived from the shared master session key KM , and refer
to unconditionally secure MACs [15], which, even if small in
size, provide a very high level of protection. We recall that,
unlike traditional message integrity and authenticity checks,
the main purpose of SMACK is early checking the validity of
CoAP messages, in order to detect (likely) ongoing Denial of
Sleep attacks, and reduce their impact on energy wasting.
Given its format and position within the CoAP message,
we believe it is perfect to rely on the Token field to include the
short MAC, as a validity check information. Specifically, upon
finalizing an outgoing CoAP request message, the sender client
produces a 16 bit random Request ID R. Such a value is used
to actually correlate the request message with its associated
response, which is the main purpose of the CoAP Token field
Fig. 3. CoAP message including short MAC.
[3]. Further details about how R is generated are out of the
scope of this paper. Then, SMACK computes a 16 bit short
MAC SM , according to the procedure described in Section
VII, which takes the concatenation of the following pieces of
information as a 6 byte input: i) the 4 byte CoAP header, i.e.
the Ver, T, TKL, Code and Message ID fields; and ii) the 2 byte
Request ID R. Finally, both R and SM are included within the
Token field of the CoAP message. Specifically, as depicted in
Figure 3, the Request ID R and the short MAC SM are carried
in the Request ID and the Validity check subfield of the Token
field, respectively. Note that, since the short MAC computation
can be considered a pseudo random function, SMACK assures
that the Token field as a whole always carries a random value.
VI. REACTIVE STRATEGIES
Together with the message validity check based on short
MAC, device D can rely on an additional strategy, aimed
at reacting in case too many invalid messages have being
received. In fact, while it is reasonable to accept occasional
invalid messages, due to the lack of reliability in adopted
communication protocols, repeated errors and frequently failed
validity checks should be treated as a deliberate DoS attack.
Let us assume that, for each active session S, device D
maintains two counters, namely CounterErrorS (CES) and
CounterAcceptedS (CAS), initialized as CES = CAS = 1
upon the establishment of session S. Also, D maintains two
global predefined threshold values, i.e. TRE and TRA. Then,
as a possible reactive strategy, device D performs the following
actions upon receiving a message M during a session S.
Valid messages. If message M conveys a valid short MAC,
then CAS = CAS+1. After that, if CAS = TRA, then CAS
is reinitialized to 1, and CES = max(1, CES − 1).
Invalid messages. If message M conveys an invalid short
MAC and CES is lower than threshold TRE , i.e. CES <
TRE , then CES = CES + 1. Instead, if CES = TRE ,
device D assumes that a DoS attack is occurring, and stops
any network activity related to session S, for a predefined time
interval tS . For instance, it can terminate session S, or even
turn off the network interface. Once the time interval tS has
elapsed, counters CES and CAS are reinitialized to 1, and
new messages are accepted within session S.
Note that the mechanism described above can be further
enhanced, by making the device more sensitive and suspicious
about DoS attack detection. For instance, in case CES goes
over threshold TRE after a predefined short time or short
amount of received messages, then device D can decrease
TRE by a fixed value. As a result, the adopted reaction policy
against DoS would be triggered after a minor number of invalid
messages has been received. Further details about adaptive
detection and reaction policies are out of the scope of this
paper, and are left for further investigation.
VII. SHORT MAC COMPUTATION
In this section, we describe how SMACK computes short
MACs introduced in Section V. Note that the procedure
we suggest here is just one among several possible ways
to perform the short MAC computation. However, since the
resulting output is an unconditionally secure MAC [16], and
algorithms used to produce it have been extensively studied
in terms of correctness and complexity, we strongly believe
that the suggested method is close to be optimal in terms of
simplicity and computational efficiency.
Having defined the short MAC to be 16 bits in size, we
assume that elements involved in the short MAC computation
are 16 bits in size as well. This is only for the sake of simplicity
in the following description, while it is clearly possible to rely
on elements of different sizes. Since CoAP does not include a
session concept [3], in the following we refer to a session as
a sequence of messages exchanged between the same client C
and device D over a short amount of time.
We denote GF (216) as a Galois field with a size of 16
bits [17], and define: i) a, b ∈ GF (216) as 16 bit key values,
unchanged for an entire session; and ii) ci ∈ GF (216) as a 16
bit key value, updated for every new message Mi exchanged
in the same session.
More specifically, let Mi be the i-th CoAP message sent
from client C to device D in a given session1. Then, let mi
be the first 48 bits in message Mi, i.e. the 32 bit CoAP header
together with the 16 bit Request ID subfield of the Token field.
We represent mi as the concatenation of three 16 bit elements,
i.e. mi = {mi0 ||mi1 ||mi2}, where mi0 ,mi1 ,mi2 ∈ GF (216),
and compute the short MAC vi associated to message Mi as
vi = (mi0 + a ·mi1 + a2 ·mi2) · b+ ci (1)
Since a2 can be precalculated and it does not change through-
out the whole session, computing a short MAC vi requires
only three additions and three multiplications2 in GF (216),
thus resulting to be extremely efficient.
Before sending message Mi to device D, client C com-
putes the short MAC vi according to Equation 1, and writes it
into the Validity check subfield of the Token field. Then, upon
the reception of Mi, device D considers the first 6 bytes of the
message, and provides them as input to Equation 1, in order
to compute the short MAC v∗i . Finally, D retrieves the short
MAC vi carried within the received message, and compares
it with v∗i . In case of a positive match, D considers the
message to be valid, i.e. it assumes that the message has been
sent by a legitimate source. Further, more in-depth, checks to
verify the authenticity of message Mi can then possibly take
1Since we are interested in protecting the device from battery drain attacks,
we focus only on messages from the client to the device, and do not consider
the opposite communication direction.
2In case special hardware for field calculations is not available, it is possible
to adopt an even more efficient scheme, where a prime field GF (p), p > 216,
is used instead of a GF (216) field. So doing, only simple and extremely
efficient mod p operations are necessary. However, this means that slightly
larger keys, i.e. 17 instead of 16 bits in size, are needed for the inner
operations, and the key consumption is consequently slightly larger as well.
place, according to other security mechanisms provided by the
application or, in general, by the adopted communication stack.
As a final note, even though the process in Equation
1 displays a very small computational effort, short MACs
produced as output still display a low probability to be forged
by an external adversary, as we prove in the following theorem.
Proposition 1: Given that the key values a, b, and ci in
Equation 1 are truly random, a successful forgery attack against
a short MAC produced by SMACK occurs with probability
equal to 2−15.
Proof: It follows from Construction 2 and Theorem 2.3
in [16] that, given a block code E with parameters (n,M, d)
and a random selected key k = {a, b, c}, a, b, c ∈ GF (q), then
the MAC tag v for message M , v ∈ GF (q), is calculated as
v = bea(M) + c (2)
where ea(M) denotes the a-th code symbol in GF (q) for
message M , and has a probability of successful impersonation
or substitution attack which is independent of the computing
power of the attacker, and is equal to
max(1/q, 1− d/n) (3)
The short MAC computation we show in Equation 1 is based
on the block code construction in Equation 2, with reference
to a Reed-Solomon code [18] over GF (216), and parameters
(n,M, d) = (216, 248, 216−2). Therefore, a successful forgery
attack against a short MAC produced by SMACK occurs with
probability equal to
max(2−16, 1− (216 − 2)/216) = 2−15 (4)
VIII. KEY DERIVATION PROCEDURE
In this section, we describe a possible approach to derive
the security keys a, b, and ci used for the short MAC
computation (see Section VII). We recall that all the three
keys are 16 bits in size.
With reference to the application scenario depicted in
Figure 1, we denote by KM the master key shared between the
device D and the Key Distribution Center KDC. We recall
that the establishment of KM is part of the device imprinting
process, that we assume to take place at deployment time. Also,
KM is not directly used to secure communication, but only to
produce further key material. Finally, D and the KDC store
a pre-shared randomly generated number of sufficient length
(e.g. 256 bits), namely seed, which is used together with KM
to generate additional security material.
The proposed key derivation procedure relies on a suitable
pseudo random function PRF (·) [19] commonly agreed by
both the KDC and D, which we assume to produce a 256
bit output. There are many available and well known pseudo
random functions, including HMAC functions [20] based on
the MD5, SHA1, and SHA2 hash functions. Although some
of them display a relatively high computational complexity, our
key derivation procedure does not require to invoke PRF (·)
as often as SMACK performs the short MAC computation,
thus limiting the resulting processing overhead.
After device deployment, both D and the KDC uses KM
and seed to derive a master session key KMS as follows.
KMS = PRF (KM , seed) (5)
Hereafter, KMS is used on the client (device) side to produce
the actual key used to compute (verify) short MACs conveyed
by CoAP messages. Also, KMS needs to be regularly renewed
through an update procedure, and securely provided to device
D. Possible schemes according to which such a key redistri-
bution actually takes place are out of the scope of this paper.
When contacted by C, the KDC replies providing it with:
i) the initial Message ID ID∗ to be used in the first CoAP
message addressed to D in this session; and ii) a session
key KS , which is valid for the current session only, and is
computed as
KS = PRF (KMS , ID
∗) (6)
If we define KSj as
KSj =
{
KS if j = 0
PRF (KS ,KSj−1) if j ≥ 1 (7)
then the short MAC vi for the i-th message in the current
session, can be computed according to Equation 1, providing
the following information as input3: i) a coincides with the
KS bits ranging from position 0 to bit in position 15; ii) b
coincides with the KS bits ranging from position 16 to bit in
position 31; and iii) ci coincides with the 16 bits in KSj , where
j = b(i+2)/16c, ranging from position ((i+2) mod 16)∗16
to position ((i+ 2) mod 16) ∗ 16 + 15.
We discuss a possible method to generate initial Message
IDs in Section IX. Note that, since CoAP Message IDs are only
16 bits in size, it may not take a long time before the KDC
generates an already used initial Message ID, regardless of
whether the very same client C, or a different one, is involved.
Thus, before providing a client with an initial Message ID
already used together with the current KMS , the latter must
be renewed and securely provided to D.
IX. MESSAGE ID MANAGEMENT
In this section, we describe how new initial Message IDs
can be generated and managed, and how device D is supposed
to process them upon receiving CoAP messages.
A. Message ID generation
As described in Section VIII, SMACK relies on a session
key KS to process CoAP messages within the same session.
However, in order to avoid replay attacks, it must be assured
that a different fresh session key is used at every session. Thus,
the adopted Message ID generation strategy must be such that
the same initial Message ID is not reused together with the
same master session key KMS . In the following, we propose
a scheme where the KDC generates fresh initial Message IDs.
First, client C contacts the KDC, and requests to establish
a new session Si with device D. Then, the KDC computes the
new initial Message ID ID∗i as ID
∗
i = (ID
∗
i−1+p) mod 2
16,
3Once the initial Message ID ID∗ has been received, the device can
precalculate all the session key material, hence speeding up short MAC
computations upon the reception of future messages.
where ID∗i−1 is the initial Message ID associated to the
previous session Si−1, and p > 2 is a suitable prime number,
of the order of 100, pre-shared by the KDC and D. Once the
new initial Message ID ID∗i has been determined, it is used
to generate a new session key KS according to Equation 6.
After that, the KDC provides client C with KS and ID∗i .
Then, C starts to communicate with device D, using ID∗i as
the Message ID of the first sent CoAP message. Given the
key generation scheme described in Section VIII, after having
sent the very first message of a new session, the client C must
receive a confirmation of correct reception on the device side.
That is, client C can transmit further messages in the same
session only after such a confirmation has been received.
Since the Message ID value is incremented by 1 every time
a different message is exchanged between C and D [3], then
a new session must be established, i.e. a new initial Message
ID must be generated, when: i) the same client C has sent p
messages to D in the same session; or ii) a different client C ′
contacts the KDC and requests to communicate with D.
The proposed scheme makes it possible to use the whole
Message ID space without duplication, so that different ses-
sions are associated with different session keys KS . However,
although it might take a practically long amount of time, the
Message ID generation process described above eventually
gets “exhausted”, once the KDC has used all the 216 available
initial Message ID values. When this happens, a new master
session key K+MS must be established between D and the
KDC. This can be done by securely exchanging a new seed
value between D and the KDC, every time the latter generates
a new initial Message ID already used together with the current
master session key KMS . Once received the new seed value, D
can locally and securely compute K+MS , and use it to generate
future session keys. Further details about methods to distribute
the new seed value are out of the scope of this paper.
B. Message ID processing
Upon receiving a CoAP message, device D must check if
the conveyed Message ID is fresh, in order to prevent replay
attacks. However, since CoAP is a connectionless protocol, it
is possible that messages are received in an arbitrary order.
Hence, we propose a sliding window approach to handle
messages that can possibly arrive out of order.
Name Content
A
Predefined acceptance windows size,
i.e. maximum number of active sessions
T
Predefined window step, i.e. number of sessions
skipped on acceptance window update (0 < T < A)
IDC
Acceptance window indicator, i.e. the
initial Message ID of the oldest active session
ÎDC
Set of initial Message IDs related to sessions
active in the current acceptance window
IDF First initial Message ID in the current session epoch
IDL Last initial Message ID in the current session epoch
TABLE I. DEVICE STATE INFORMATION.
Device D maintains the state information reported in Table
I. We assume that, during the imprinting process, D has been
provided with a valid value for IDF , i.e. the initial Message
ID to be used by the KDC for the first session involving
device D. Also, for every currently active session S with initial
Message ID ID∗, D maintains a set R̂ID∗ containing Message
IDs of all valid messages belonging to S received so far. This
makes it possible to promptly detect retransmissions of old
authentic messages, hence preventing possible replay attacks.
The following procedure describes how device D evaluates
Message IDs upon message reception.
Epoch startup. Device D initializes ÎDC as ÎDC = ∅, and
accepts any Message M conveying a Message ID IDM s.t.
IDM = (IDF+m·p)mod 216, m ∈ N, 0 < m < A. Then, D
derives the session key KS according to Equation 6, i.e. KS =
PRF (KMS , IDM ), and verifies M validity by checking its
short MAC, as described in Section VII. In case M is found to
be a valid message, D initializes IDC as IDC = IDM , and
updates ÎDC as ÎDC ← ÎDC ∪ {IDM}. Also, it determines
the last valid initial Message ID IDL in the current session
epoch4, s.t. (IDL +A · p) mod 216 = IDC . Finally, IDM is
stored in the R̂IDM associated to the just started session S.
Then, for every new message M with Message ID IDM
received by device D, the following actions are performed.
Case 1: New session message. If Message ID
IDM = (IDC +m · p) mod 216, m ∈ N, 0 < m < A, and
IDM /∈ ÎDC (i.e. M is not a replay), then D computes the
session key KS as KS = PRF (KMS , IDM ), and checks
the short MAC conveyed in M . If M results to be valid, it
is considered as the first message of a new session S, and
D updates ÎDC as ÎDC ← ÎDC ∪ {IDM}. Then, IDM is
stored in the set R̂IDM associated to the new session S. Then,
if |ÎDC | = A, device D: i) removes the T elements related
to the T “oldest” active sessions from ÎDC , i.e. it moves the
acceptance window forward by T positions; ii) removes the
T sets R̂ associated to such sessions; and iii) assigns IDC to
the element in ÎDC related to the oldest active session.
Case 2: Active session message. If ∃ ID ∈ ÎDC , s.t.
ID < IDM < (ID + p) mod 2
16, IDM /∈ R̂ID (i.e. M is
not a replay), and the short MAC check is passed, then D
stores IDM in the set R̂ID, and accepts M as a message of
an active session within the current acceptance window.
Case 3: Invalid message. If none of the above conditions
holds, then M is discarded and no further actions are taken.
Finally, once 216 − (A− 1) sessions have been authorized by
the KDC, the latter renews the master session key KMS in
order to prevent its reusage. Then, the KDC provides device
D with the new master session key K+MS and the first initial
Message ID of the next session epoch, i.e. IDF . On the other
hand, when a message M whose Message ID IDM = IDF
is received, and it is accepted as described in Case 1 above,
then D starts processing only messages associated to already
active sessions, and stops from establishing any further new
sessions. Then, once it has been provided with the new
master session key K+MS and IDF , D initializes IDF as
IDF = IDF , and moves back to the Epoch startup phase
described above, hence initiating the new session epoch.
4IDL can be computed as IDL = IDC − A · p if IDC ≥ A · p, or
IDL = 2
16 − (A · p− IDC) if IDC < A · p.
X. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate SMACK, we developed a prototype implemen-
tation for resource constrained platforms. In this section, we
show that, even with no particular optimizations, our imple-
mentation displays an affordable overhead in terms of mem-
ory requirements, computing time and energy consumption.
Also, when compared to DTLS, our approach detects invalid
messages while displaying a smaller computing overhead and
requiring no additional communication with device D.
For our tests, we considered a commodity PC as CoAP
client C, featuring 16 GB of RAM and an Intel i5-3470 CPU,
and running the Java SE runtime environment. The client ran
our extended version of the Java library Californium, which
provides both the CoAP and DTLS protocols [21]. As CoAP
server D, we considered a resource constrained device based
on the CC2538 platform [22], featuring a 32 MHz CPU, and
provided with 512 KB and 32 KB of flash memory and RAM,
respectively. The server ran our extended version of CoAP
provided by Contiki and based on the Erbium library [23].
Also, we referred to the tinydtls library implementing the
DTLS protocol for resource constrained platforms [24]. For
simplicity, we considered the initial message ID and session
key KS as pre-loaded on C. To enable communication between
C and D, we relied on an additional router node based on
the same CC2538 platform and running the Contiki operating
system. Finally, we used the Energest framework provided by
Contiki to collect time measurements on device D. Energest
has been proven to accurately estimate energy consumption
and increase the computing time only of the 0.7% [25].
Compared to the original CoAP protocol provided by
Contiki, our implementation of SMACK, even without any par-
ticular optimizations, results in additional 1.65 KB (+1.01%)
of memory on device D, including also an H-MAC function
(i.e. the same one adopted by DTLS [7]). In contrast, provid-
ing support for DTLS through the tinydtls library results in
additional 37.39 KB (+22.71%) of memory on device D.
We ran a set of experimental tests on a local network,
considering a system not running any security services and
a system relying on DTLS. More in detail, we first ran our
test environment in the presence of CoAP only. Then, we
relied on the very same set-up, with the additional presence of
DTLS to secure communication. Finally, we ran the very same
experiments considering CoAP together with SMACK only,
without the presence of DTLS. This set of experiments allows
us to compare overheads in terms of increase in the CoAP
message exchange length, and additional computing time and
energy consumption, with respect to a system including either
only CoAP or both CoAP and DLTS. All results have been
averaged over 20 independent replications, and confidence
intervals have been derived, with 95% confidence level.
To keep this comparison as fair as possible, we considered
the DTLS cryptosuite TLS PSK WITH AES 128 CCM 8
[26], which is accounted as suitable to compact implemen-
tations and constrained devices. In fact, it is based on a pre-
shared key handshake, hence avoiding more resource consum-
ing operations based on public keys. Also, although it provides
both confidentiality and data origin authentication, it is based
on a single authenticated encryption operation.
A single test consists of 10 CoAP message exchanges,
namely transactions, between C and D. More in detail, firstly
C transmits a CoAP request message M1 to D, whose total
size is 15 bytes. Once received and processed it, D replies back
to C, sending a CoAP response message M2, whose total size
is 24 bytes. We separately present results referred to either
the first transaction or the last transaction, so distinguishing
overheads occurring either at communication startup, or when
communication has reached a steady state. The rest of this
section refers to the following three test cases.
1. CoAP ONLY considers the original CoAP protocol only,
with no additional security services.
2. CoAP SMACK considers the CoAP protocol together with
SMACK, without the presence of DTLS. Since only CoAP
request messages carry a short MAC, every transaction results
in 1 short MAC computation on the client side, and 1 short
MAC check on the server side. The key generation procedure
described in Section VIII relies on a PRF (·) function based
on the SHA-256 hash function. Note that no additional com-
munication occurs with device D.
3. CoAP DTLS considers the CoAP protocol together with
DTLS. Every transaction results in: i) 4 security operations,
i.e. 1 encryption and 1 decryption, both on the client and
server side; and ii) the transmission of 42 additional bytes, due
to the presence of the 13 byte DTLS header and the 8 byte
DTLS Message Authentication Code (MAC). Note that the first
transaction comprises the execution of the DTLS handshake.
First, we evaluate the transaction length TL from the
client standpoint. Depending on the specific test case, the
TL is defined as (te1 − tb1) for CoAP ONLY, (te2 − tb2) for
CoAP SMACK, or (te3 − tb3) for CoAP DTLS. Times tb1 and
te1 refer to when C sends M1 and receives M2, respectively.
Times tb2 and t
e
2 refer to when C starts computing the short
MAC on M1 and receives M2, respectively. Time tb3 refers to
when C starts a DTLS handshake, if needed, or begins securing
M1, while time te3 refers to when C finishes to unsecure M2.
CoAP ONLY CoAP SMACK CoAP DTLS
First 35.930 ms 40.941 ms 385.688 ms
transaction ±0.831 ms ±1.070 ms ±25.223 ms
Last 32.790 ms 34.840 ms 39.062 ms
transaction ±1.365 ms ±2.428 ms ±0.761 ms
TABLE II. TRANSACTION LENGTH.
Table II shows the TL values collected on the client side.
With respect to the CoAP ONLY test case, we can observe
that the TL slightly increases in the presence of SMACK,
and further increases in the presence of DTLS. As expected,
such increments become smaller when communication has
reached a steady state. On the other hand, if we consider the
first transaction, DTLS results in a TL which is roughly 10
times greater than in the CoAP ONLY and CoAP SMACK test
cases. This is mainly due to the execution of the complex
DTLS handshake, upon establishing a new DTLS session.
Such results are consistent with the fact that, with respect to
SMACK, the DTLS protocol performs more complex security
operations, and requires the transmission of larger messages.
Now, we evaluate the processing time on the server side.
In particular, we refer to the following two metrics.
TCPUT : total time spent to perform SMACK or DTLS
operations on a received message M1, in the test cases
CoAP SMACK and CoAP DTLS, respectively. This takes into
account also initialization and management of data structures,
as well as the DTLS handshake for the test case CoAP DTLS.
TCPUS : time specifically spent to check the validity of a
received message M1. In the test case CoAP SMACK, it con-
siders the short MAC check performed by SMACK. Instead,
in the test case CoAP DTLS, it encompasses the decryption
and authenticity check performed by DTLS.
First transaction Last transaction
CoAP SMACK CoAP DTLS CoAP SMACK CoAP DTLS
TCPUT
3.992 ms 220.703 ms 0.517 ms 0.705 ms
±0.010 ms ±5.153 ms ±0.012 ms ±0.008 ms
TCPUS
0.455 ms 0.676 ms 0.447 ms 0.680 ms
±0.010 ms ±0.010 ms ±0.012 ms ±0.008 ms
TABLE III. DEVICE COMPUTING OVERHEAD.
Table III shows the computing overhead on the server side.
As expected, the computing times TCPUT in the first transaction
are always sensibly higher than the ones in the last transaction.
Also, the total computing overhead TCPUT due to DTLS in
the first transaction is roughly 55 times higher than the same
overhead due to SMACK. Once again, such a result is mainly
due to performing the DTLS handshake. Furthermore, we can
observe that, in steady state conditions, the overall computing
overhead TCPUT due to SMACK is the 26.66% less than the
same one due to DTLS. Besides, the overhead TCPUS due to
the actual short MAC check is the 34.26% less than the same
overhead due to DTLS security operations.
Now, we evaluate the energy consumption on the server side.
We consider the total energy consumption as the sum of three
contributions, i.e. E = ECPU +ETX +ERX . That is, ECPU
is the energy consumed by the CPU, while ETX and ERX are
the energies consumed by the radio interface in transmission
and reception mode, respectively. Each single contribution is
computed as the product between the related time collected by
the Energest framework, and the related power consumption
reported in [22]. Finally, we refer to the following four metrics.
ET: total energy spent for a received message M1. It takes into
account also initialization and management of data structures,
as well as the DTLS handshake for the test case CoAP DTLS.
ES: energy specifically spent to check the authenticity of
a received message M1. In the test case CoAP SMACK,
it considers the short MAC check performed by SMACK.
Instead, in the test case CoAP DTLS, it encompasses the
decryption and authenticity check performed by DTLS.
ECPUT : CPU-related fraction of the ET energy.
ECPUS : CPU-related fraction of the ES energy.
First transaction Last transaction
CoAP SMACK CoAP DTLS CoAP SMACK CoAP DTLS
ET
323.236 µJ 18, 034.863 µJ 41.808 µJ 57.376 µJ
±0.781 µJ ±374.101 µJ ±0.855 µJ ±0.649 µJ
ES
36.557 µJ 55.028 µJ 36.305 µJ 54.849 µJ
±0.774 µJ ±0.535 µJ ±0.950 µJ ±0.430 µJ
ECPUT
83.826 µJ 4, 634.766 µJ 10.863 µJ 14.804 µJ
±0.209 µJ ±108.214 µJ ±0.248 µJ ±0.166 µJ
ECPUS
9.549 µJ 14.195 µJ 9.389 µJ 14.291 µJ
±0.215 µJ ±0.201 µJ ±0.244 µJ ±0.171 µJ
TABLE IV. DEVICE ENERGY OVERHEAD.
Table IV reports the energy spent on the server side. As
expected, the energy consumptions ET and ECPUT in the first
transaction are always sensibly higher than the ones in the last
transaction. More important, both ET and ECPUT due to DTLS
in the first transaction are roughly 55 times higher than the
same overheads due to SMACK. This suggests that SMACK is
particularly efficient against DoS attacks inducing the estab-
lishment of new communication sessions. Furthermore, we can
observe that, in steady state conditions, the overall energy
consumptions ET and ECPUT due to SMACK are the 27.13%
and 26.62% less than the same ones due to DTLS, respectively.
Besides, the energy consumptions ES and ECPUS due to the
actual short MAC check are the 33.81% and 34.3% less than
the same overheads due to DTLS security operations. It follows
that the message validity check based on the short MAC proves
to be considerably more efficient than standard authentication
techniques, and thus is a good choice to efficiently detect DoS
attacks and reduce their impact on constrained devices.
Note that, during out tests, we did not benefit of any power
saving mode available on the CC2538 platform. As a result,
once a CoAP message has been entirely received, the radio
interface remains active in reception mode, as long as the
message processing is completed. This explains why, both for
the first and last transaction, we always have ET  ECPUT
and ES  ECPUS , even though SMACK does not require any
additional communication on the server side. Of course, energy
consumption can be further reduced by properly exploiting
power saving modes available on the considered platform.
XI. CONCLUSION
We have presented SMACK, a security service aimed
at reducing the impact of Denial of Sleep attacks against
resource constrained IoT devices. SMACK relies on a short
Message Authentication Code (MAC) to early and efficiently
detect messages sent by illegitimate sources. This avoids
additional parsing and processing on invalid messages, re-
ducing the impact of Denial of Sleep attacks. We have
provided an adaptation of SMACK for the CoAP protocol,
and experimentally evaluated its performance on our prototype
implementation for the constrained CC2538 platform. Results
show that SMACK is sustainable and efficient in terms of
memory footprint, computing time, and energy consumption.
Also, when compared to DTLS, it detects invalid messages
while displaying a smaller computing overhead, without re-
quiring any additional communication with IoT devices. Future
works will evaluate SMACK together with additional reaction
mechanisms in the presence of different DoS attacks, and
consider secure schemes to renew long-term key material.
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